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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to ascertain the major trends of corporate governance in Asia in an interdisciplinary approach based 
on both the legal and the management studies. First, major legal theories encouraging the ‘Transplantation’ of Western models to 
Asia are reviewed, which reveals a theoretical distortion between the normative goals and the technical designs of corporate 
governance (section2). Next, several actual cases of þTransplantationÿ  in Asia are reviewed, which describes limited 
outcomes especially when poor þmodel lawsÿ are transplanted in a simple þreceptiveÿ way (in section3). Then, apart from 
the þTransplantationÿ on the formal written law level, a deeper level of living laws or actual practices amid regional economic 
integration is observed based on an interim report of a corporate survey which the author and her colleagues have recently been 
conducting on the Japanese SME investment in Asia (section4). A general implication drawn from the article is that the þ
Transplantationÿ or þConvergence’ of the formal law means nothing without any local initiatives to ‘customize’ them as living 
laws within the actual commercial practice. An accumulation of empirical studies on such dynamic processes of the local 
customization of transplanted models will contribute to the exploration of the best practices in Asia. 
© 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
þConvergence’ has been asserted as a phenomenon taking place among the US and European countries, where 
the legal systems are considered to become closer to each other while forming some ‘international best practice’. 
This campaign has also been providing a fundamental theoretical base to justify the ‘Transplantation’ of Western 
best practices to other regions by way of numerous law reform projects in the auspice of international development 
agencies (Pistor and Wellons 1999). Corporate governance is a typical economic law area where such þ
Convergenceÿ is believed to have been taking place especially toward the US model of þshareholder value 
maximizationÿ  (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001). It is also a well-known fact that leading international 
development agencies, such as the World Bank and the EBRD, have been actively promoting ‘model laws’ formed 
mainly based on the US model, for the purpose of guiding and evaluating the progress of “Transplantation” in 
recipient countries. Thus, the theory of ‘Convergence’ asserted as an unintended natural phenomenon among 
developed countries has been providing a theoretical base of þTransplantationÿ or an intentional or even forced 
convergence in transition and developing countries.  
However, it should be noted that the debates against the þConvergenceÿ have been equally strong. Some 
authors persuasively insist the þpath-dependencyÿ of legal development, and instead describe the þDivergenceÿ 
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as an actual phenomenon (Bubchuk and Roe 1999). Also interestingly, a growing number of recent articles are 
adding objective evidences to disprove the ‘Convergence’ to the US model, indicating an interesting new trend that 
the UK law and European civil law are coming closer to each other while showing apparent divergence from the US 
law (Armour et al. 2007). 
If the ‘Convergence’ to the US model is not a real, the presumption of the US model as an ‘international best 
practice’ cannot be automatically sustained. Accordingly, the justification for the ‘Transplantation’ of the US model 
would be lost. It must be necessary to re-question the need of þTransplantationÿ as well as the adequacy of the US 
model as its sole base. 
With this basic suspicion on ‘Transplantation’ or a forced convergence in mind, the ultimate purpose of this 
paper is to explore the real trend of Asian corporate governance: what sorts of convergence or divergence are taking 
place. For this goal, the first task is to ascertain the true nature of what is trying to be ‘transplanted’ in Asia. 
Following, in section 2.1, the debate over the diversifying concept of ‘shareholder value maximization’ in the US 
academic scene will be reviewed, though the concept tends to be considered as a simple and firm basis of 
‘Transplantation’ in Asia. An objective classification will be proposed to observe the distortion between the 
institutional choices of corporate governance and the policy goals of corporate law. Then section 2.2 will try a 
careful reading of þmodel lawsÿ being promoted in the þTransplantationÿ, in order to recognize their basic 
policy stance within the above-mentioned classification. 
Then, section3 will review actual cases of corporate law reforms in Asia, taken mainly from the Post-Asian 
Crisis reforms and the gradualist reforms of Asian socialist economies, for the purpose of considering the outcomes 
of þTransplantationÿ. An implication will be that a receptive þTransplantationÿ does not always improve the 
practice, while positive pursuits continued in un-receptive þTransplantationÿ cases are showing better economic 
results. 
Section4 will try going further into the reality of what is happening on the very front of Asian corporate 
governance, in the interaction of law and practice. An interim report of a corporate survey which the author and her 
colleague economists have been conducting in major investment target countries in Asia will give a hint of another 
þConvergenceÿ to a formation of Asian best practices, especially for non-listed companies. 
This article maintains that the corporate governance is an argument to include both normative goals and technical 
designs. The corporate social responsibility (CSR) is considered as an important part of the normative aspect of the 
corporate governance. Though it is often discussed that the CSR is a normative goal for the corporate governance, 
and that the latter is basically a purely technical arguments on how to form company structures (Thomsen 2007, p.40 
for example), this article does not apply such a separated view. 
2. Shaking Theories of ‘Transplantation’ 
2.1 Diversification of the US Model 
The most famous justification for the þTransplantationÿ  of the US model has been the theory of þ
Convergenceÿ which asserts that the corporate laws of major developed countries all shows growing conformity 
with the US-style corporate law design which sets the corporate ultimate goal on the þ shareholder value 
maximizationÿ (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001, p.439). However, it should be noted that such a shareholder-
centered ideology has not always been a sole belief in the US where various different theories are compete with the 
ideology. Also, the shareholder-centered ideology in itself often contains extremely different meanings of þ
shareholder valueÿ  which reflect a variety of policy choices. Therefore, apart from testing whether the þ
Convergenceÿ to the US model is a real empirical phenomenon, which has attracted numbers of interesting articles 
with negative evidences recently (Armour et al. 2007, etc.), the ‘Transplantation’ will not be justified without 
identifying the actual policy choice of ‘shareholder value’ being promoted in the ‘model laws’. 
First, among all theories contesting the shareholder-centered ideology, there is a stream of schools that respect 
the role of a director as a referee among various corporate stakeholders. From the very days of Berle & Means 
(1932)ÿs appeal of the recovery of shareholder-centered governance amid the þseparation of ownership and 
controlÿ phenomenon, the famous Berle vs. Dodd debate was started, where Dodd (1932) insisted the directorsÿ 
role as referee to contribute to the society, while Berle (1932) refereed to the reality of rent-seekings by directors. 
Later, the school of þTransaction Costÿ theory stemmed from Coarse (1937) to Williamson (1985), as well as the 
þIncomplete Contractÿ theory such as Hart (1995), identified a far more complicated nature of corporate existence 
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than a financial relationship with shareholders, where the directors are expected to make a highly professional 
balance amid a þnexus of contractsÿ  with a variety of stakeholders already committed to þ firm-specific 
investmentsÿ both explicit and implicit (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Until recently, academic discussions in this 
stream aimed to solve such major questions for directors as the ‘underinvestment’ or to avoid the ‘holdup’ among 
different stakeholders (for example Tirole 2001). After all these views on the complexity of corporate existence 
widened, a recent assertion of the ‘Team Production’ approach is considered as a revival of Dodd’s school to justify 
the maximized role of directors in conformity with the current context of ‘corporate social responsibility (CSR)’ 
(Blair and Stout 2006). 
Thus, it is noteworthy that the shareholder-centered ideology has never been the only prevailing model, however 
strongly the þConvergenceÿ claimers insist so, but there is an accumulation of reviving arguments to defend the 
important role of directors to balance among stakeholders. However, at the same time, it should be noted that these 
sophisticated academic arguments on the increased role of directors have also been providing justifications to the 
trend of þderegulationÿ in the actual law-making scene in the US. It must be an interesting fact that almost all 
corporate law reforms to strengthen the regulations, including the introduction of strict disclosure rules at the SEC 
introduced since the 1930s after the disastrous NY stock market clash, development of þindependent directorsÿ 
and an audit committee system especially in the 1970s, shareholderÿ s derivative suits and other minority 
shareholdersÿ rights, as well as the culture of policy-based activism of institutional investors in hostile takeovers, 
all have been made within the traditional framework of þagencyÿ theory or the shareholder-centered model. It has 
been the school to promote the directorÿs role as referee or corporate contract nexus which have often been utilized 
as the theoretical base to deregulate the results of all above mentioned regulating efforts: to reduce the level of 
disclosure rules, to limit the requirements for independent directors, to introduce various anti-takeover devices, and 
to mitigate the directorsÿ responsibilities under the þbusiness judgment ruleÿ. There is a contradiction between 
the conservative outlook of the shareholder-centered model which has, in actual, been acting for the activistsÿ sake, 
and the sophisticated outlook of the directors-centered model appearing open to the latest appeal of corporate social 
responsibility but, in actual, having been serving for the conservative policy of deregulation. 
Another question is the diversified meaning of ‘shareholder value maximization’, which could differ according to 
the variety of targeted ‘shareholders’. If the assumed company structure is a concentrated one, targeted 
‘shareholders’ must mainly refer to ‘controlling shareholders’ and to a limited extent ‘minority shareholders’. But if 
the company structure is a dispersed one, ‘shareholders’ must primarily be a large majority of ‘individual 
shareholders’ but at the same time include ‘institutional investors’ which often intervene into corporate decision-
makings much deeper than ordinary shareholders do. Further, these þinstitutional investorsÿ must be classified at 
least into either the short-term profit-makers such as hedge funds, or the social policy-led activists such as Calpers 
who tend to be long-term investors especially under the ELISA and sensitive enough to the corporate social 
responsibilities. Assuming thus diversified characters of þshareholdersÿ, the meaning of þshareholder value 
maximizationÿ must also diverge from the higher stock price reflecting the temporarily corporate asset to pay more 
dividends, to the longer-term corporate value to ensure constant payments of dividends. The normative basis to 
evaluate the corporate value also diverges: as the þefficiencyÿ or the þtotal welfare standardÿ is applied by the 
short-term profit-seekersiwhile the social policy-led investors evaluate the long-term corporate value from the 
viewpoint of CSR. 
An interesting distortion is recognized between the policy choices on corporate governance and the 
corresponding legal designs (see Table1 below). Both the shareholder-centered approach referring to short-term 
profit-maximization and the directorsÿ fiducially approach, are similarly fond of deregulated legal designs; while 
the another shareholder-centered approach referring to long-term corporate values seeks more þre-regulationsÿ, 
just as in case of European-style governance centering on stakeholders. 
Thus, there are varieties of understanding on ‘shareholder value’, and corresponding legal designs can differ. 
Then, what is the meaning of ‘shareholder value’ reflected in the legal design of ‘model laws’ in the 
‘Transplantation’? It is not automatically clear without a careful reading into the details. The purpose of the next 
sub-section is to study the details of þmodel lawsÿ to ascertain the real meaning of þshareholder valueÿ pursued 
in the þTransplantationÿ. 
 
Table 1Classification of Policy Choices and Legal Designs of Corporate Governance 
6886  Kaneko Yuka / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 6883–6895 
Corporate Theory Feature of 
Corporate Governance 
Policy Choice Legal Design of 
Corporate Governance 
Agency Theory Shareholder-centered Shareholder Value meant for 
Individual Investors 
=Long-term Corporate 
Value 
Maximization (=CSR) 
Re-regulation: 
-Market-side  
Governance 
Minority Shareholdersÿ Rights 
Derivative Suites 
Shareholder Value meant for 
Institutional Investors 
=Short-term Corporate Value 
Maximization 
Deregulation: 
Institutional Investor as 
Stabilizer-Insider˖ 
Independent Directors/ Audit 
Committee to tell þcorporate best 
interest’ 
Transaction Cost 
Theory; 
Incomplete 
Contract Theory 
Directors’  
Fiduciary Role as 
Referee 
Private Autonomy; 
CSR as an excuse to 
block Shareholder 
Activism 
Deregulation: 
-Antitakeover devices 
-Freedom of contract 
Business Judgment Rule/ 
Immunity of liability 
Corporate Itself 
Theory 
Stakeholders Long-term Corporate 
Existence (=CSR) 
Re-regulation: 
Participation-Disclosure 
 
 
2.2 Shareholder-Centered Approach in þModel Lawsÿ 
International Development Agencies have been promoting ‘Model Laws’ in the corporate governance area 
especially since the introduction of the most influential “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” formally 
adopted in 1999 (later revised in 2004) in response to the need of Post-Asian Crisis reforms. Because this OECD Ā
Principleā only gave general instructions, and detailed designs were left open for further elaborations, succeeding 
þmodel lawsÿ explored each different way. Among all, the following discussion will turn to EBRD (2000) Ā
Principles of Corporate Governance and Corporate Governance Checklistā which constitutes a part of EBRDÿs 
rating activities on the legal development known as the ĀLegal Indicator Survey (LIS)ā since the mid1990s, as 
well as the World Bank (2003) “Template for Country Assessment of Corporate Governance, Revision 3” which 
forms a base of evaluation under the “Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)” by the World 
Bank and the IMF. Though both of them equally center on such major US-style corporate law menus as hostile 
takeovers, minority shareholdersÿ  rights, and independent directors, but the nature of their respective þ
shareholder valueÿ is not apparently clear without looking into the details. 
(i) EBRD “Checklist” 
An initial reading of the EBRDÿs ĀChecklistā will show its basic stance of ‘re-regulationÿ meant for 
strengthening corporate social functions. It tries to materialize the pressure of þmarket for corporate controlÿ in 
the security market by proposing concrete ways to limit anti-takeover devices of the management, especially via 
decisions of shareholders made under the special majority vote to reflect minority opinions of individual 
shareholders rather than the institutional investors who might often act as insiders (section IE). It also strengthens 
the built-in chances of minority shareholdersÿ participation in the important corporate decision-making process 
with such concrete numerical thresholds as a quorum at more than 51 % of issued capital, the special majority rule at 
more than 75% of issued capital, and 10% limitation for the cross-shareholding, etc. (section IA~ID), all of which 
represent the basic stance to protect the interests of ordinary individual shareholders from the manipulation by the 
controlling shareholders and/or the institutional investors as insiders who share interests with the management. 
Thus, the nature of þshareholder-centered ideologyÿ here is recognized as an idealistic corporate democracy to 
promote the re-regulation for protecting the long-term interests of individual shareholders. Also, beyond these US-
style shareholder-centered designs, there are several concrete proposals for strengthening stakeholdersÿ rights, 
including the co-determination involving workers and creditorsÿ intervention to important decisions (chapter III), 
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as well as stakeholdersÿ access to the disclosure (section IVC), all which must represent another aspect of basic 
re-regulationist’s  attitude of ĀChecklistā in pursuit of long-term corporate value. 
However, these detailed idealistic designs cannot be reflected directly in the ‘Transplantation’ process, since the 
same “Checklist” applies a bias to categorize each proposed design into three classes of ‘Highly Desirable’, 
‘Desirable’ and ‘no comment’. A careful review of this bias will show a visible tendency that almost all important 
þre-regulationistÿ designs are put into the þno commentÿ category, the outcome of which is a þderegulationÿ
. For example, on the role of hostile takeovers in the security market-side governance (section IE), though the 
notice requirement is þHighly Desirableÿ , regulation of mandatory offer is merely þDesirableÿ , and no 
comment is made at all for the procedural limitation on anti-takeover devices, which reveals a compromise for the 
sake of directorsÿ  interest against the pressure of þmarket for corporate controlÿ . Also, on the reach of 
mandatory decision-making issues for the shareholdersÿ  meetings (section IA), though the nomination of 
directors and their remuneration are þHighly Desirable’, nomination of auditors is just ’Desirable’, and no 
comment is made for various other items, which must result in a fairly wide mandate for the management without 
substantial recovery of shareholders’ status. 
Thus, regardless of its fundamental activist stance envisaged in the details of original design, the outcome of the 
EBRD’s “Checklist” is a ‘deregulation’ for the sake of directors’ discretion, which implies a thin substance of 
‘shareholder value’ only meant for large shareholders. 
(ii) World Bank “Template” 
The policy stance read from the detailed design of the World Bankÿs ĀTemplateā is more simply a þ
deregulationÿ. First, on the role of þmarket for corporate controlÿ in the security market, the anti-takeover 
devices are admitted as a matter of fact (section B.44), without any procedural limitation such that envisaged in the 
EBRD’s “Checklist”. 
Also, for the minority shareholders’ rights, though a relatively wide reference is made, no such particular 
standard or condition as in the EBRD’s “Checklist” is articulated for either of the right to call for the shareholders’ 
meetings, quorum, voting rules, prior notice, or proxy contests (section B.24-B.26), as if the ĀTemplateā has no 
serious intention to materialize them. Only one exception is the preemptive right (section B.21), which implies the 
basic management-friendly stance of the ĀTemplateā to suggest dissenting shareholders to leave, rather than stay 
to have voice in the corporate decision-making process. 
On the directors’ responsibilities, the deregulationist “Template” suddenly turns to apply many regulations such 
that elaborating the ‘business judgment rule’ and showing concerns on insurances and other systems to protect the 
management from derivative suites (section E.1-E.6). Also, there is an apparent tendency to draw more attention to 
legally non-binding principles for the disclosure, such as þCode of Conductsÿ, þCode of Ethicsÿ and all other 
similar soft laws in the context of þcorporate social responsibility’ (section E.17), as if trying to avoid the legally 
binding basis of director responsibilities. 
Thus, the basic policy stance of the World Bankÿs ĀTemplateā is a þderegulationÿ meant for the discretion 
of the management. Though its lineup of minority shareholdersÿ rights gives an impression of a þshareholder-
centered approachÿ, but there is less effort made for the materialization of these rights, which predicts the outcome 
of manipulations by large shareholders who have more chances to bargain with the management. In the 
‘Transplantation’ practice, these large shareholders would never work as a hero of the shareholdersÿ activism 
meant for long-term corporate value, since it is unusual that any recipient country has such policy-led institutional 
investors as Calpers. 
In summary, these influential þmodel lawsÿ have a basic policy stance of þderegulationÿ, notwithstanding 
their shareholder-centered outlook at the first glance. Directors are vested with wide discretions, and protected from 
the activist attack both at the security market side and in the derivative suites. Minority shareholdersÿ protection is 
not strong enough to defend themselves against the control by large shareholders. This reality of þmodel lawsÿ 
may cast a doubt over the relevant idea of the þself-regulatory model’ which has been asserted as a theoretical base 
to promote ‘model laws’ in the local contextures of reforming countries. 
 
2.3 Self-Regulatory Model 
The þself-regulatory modelÿ or þself-enforcing modelÿ is an argument insisting that corporate laws in 
reforming countries should center on the procedural regulations to enable the corporate internal dispute resolutions, 
rather than the substantial regulations (a prohibitive approach) which must finally be interpreted by legal authorities 
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(Black and Kraakman 1996, p.1912). This argument consists of two main assertions: First, the corporate law design 
should rely less on the local legal authorities, given the local context of weak institutions (supra, p.1920 et seq.). 
Second, the corporate law should have less substantial rules, given the local context of a highly controlled company 
culture which must result in outright disregard of prohibitive regulations (supra, p.1929 et seq.). Though these 
considerations for local socio-economic realities are highly appreciated among þTransplantationÿ promoters 
(Pistor 2002), it should be noted that all these þcontextualÿ discussions are utilized for the promotion of a þ
uniform’ model. 
Then, the question is the true nature of such a ‘uniform’ model. As is clearly assumed by the authors themselves, 
the central policy goal of the model is set on “the balance between investor protection and the business discretion of 
corporate managers” (Black and Kraakman supra, p.1921). A review of its detailed contents will support this 
assumption: the lineup of shareholders’ rights is only limited to the cumulative voting for directors’ nominations, 
preemptive rights of dissenting shareholders, special majorities for mergers and material assets transactions with 
loose thresholds, and the approval for directorsÿ self-interested transactions without clear substantial standards. 
None of such activistÿs procedural tools as the right to call general shareholder meetings, the right to place 
agendas, and/or the right to bring derivative suites is included. Without a doubt, the basic policy stance of the þself-
regulatory modelÿ is a deregulation, which purports to have minimum substantial regulations in order to ensure the 
discretion of the management while minimizing the risks to be sued in court. The contextual outlook is considered 
as a mere outcome of a compromise between the Russian reformist-draft writers and the American scholars from the 
deregulation circle. 
 
In this section, the detailed designs of major þmodel lawsÿ have been reviewed as well as the concept of þ
self-regulatory modelÿ as one of the most influential justifications for them. The main finding is that, despite of 
their campaign of the þshareholder-centered approachÿ to give impressions to be reformists, they all take the 
policy choice of þderegulationÿ making much of a compromise between the management discretion and the large 
shareholdersÿ interest for profits. Then, the next question is the outcomes of this conservative ‘model laws’ in the 
‘Transplantation’ process. 
3. Outcomes of ‘Transition’ in Asian Corporate Governance Reform 
3.1Post-Asian Crisis Reforms: Thailand, Indonesia and Korea 
In the process of recovery from the Asian Crisis, the relevant reforming countries were forced to renovate their 
respective corporate law designs under the pressure of IMF/ World Bank’s conditionalities. The IMF’s quarterly 
Letter of Intents and/or the Policy Matrix attached to the World Bankÿs adjustment loans listed up typical menus of 
US-style corporate governance such as disclosure rules, audits and accounting principles all meant for the 
strengthening of þmarket for corporate controlÿ in the security market side, as well as the structuring of internal 
governance by the introduction of independent directors and an audit committee system in listed companies. These 
menus were later confirmed by more systemic frameworks of ‘Transplantation’ such as the ‘ROSC’. The question is 
how far the reforming countries have implemented these conditionalities. 
(i) Thailand 
Thailand responded to the conditionalities quickly and obediently, and was successfully released from the Post-
Crisis IMF control by June, 2000. However, this quickness meant a minimum sufficient response to the reform 
menus, which was by no means an initiative to achieve a thorough reconstruction of what had been wrong. The 
menus of reform were limited to what had been forced by the conditionalities. Also, the mode of reform was 
introduction of merely temporary administrative regulations such as security market regulations, while no 
substantial review occurred for such fundamental legislations as the 1992 Public Company Act or the private 
company provisions under the 1932 Civil & Commercial Code. Even a draft of the 1992 Public Company Act 
amendment was rejected in 2000 though it contained only minor changes such as loosening of thresholds for some 
minority shareholdersÿ rights. Also, the reach of reforms was limited to listed companies, while problems of 
regulations for non-listed companies (under the 1932 Civil & Commercial Code) were left completely untouched 
although they had been deemed as real causes behind the Crisis. 
Nevertheless, international agencies never blamed these limitations of coverage, mode, and reach of the reform, 
all apparently problematic when viewed in the local context. It is highly presumable that these agencies just did not 
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realize the gap between the local contexts and their ‘Transplantation’ based mainly on the US model which has been 
historically targeted for listed companies on the security market side. It must have been the responsibility of 
counterparts in Thailand to point to the gap and initiate a reform of their own, but they continued to be merely 
obedient. 
(ii) Indonesia 
Indonesia showed similar passive attitudes only to respond in a minimumly sufficient way to the conditionalities. 
Though the slow pace of its reform has been internationally blamed especially when compared to other reforming 
countries including Thailand, they are found similar in the basic obedient attitude toward the conditionalities. As, at 
the time of the Asian Crisis, Indonesia had just started adopting the 1995 Company Law which was developed under 
the auspice of international assistance mainly from the World Bank and USAID, these donors did not force much 
reform in the corporate law area in the Post-Crisis conditionalities. In other words, þTransplantationÿ  was 
considered to have been finished at that stage, and no additional reform was being considered necessary. This 
inactive stance of donors must have decided the minor priority of corporate governance reform in the 
condtionalities, which seems to have killed the local initiative to reconstruct their corporate governance while filling 
the gap between the transplanted formal law and the local socio-economic reality. It was only after the World Bank
ÿs ĀTemplateā was applied to Indonesia under the ĀROSCā program and suggested some reforms in 2004 
(see World Bank 2004) that the Indonesian government prepared a draft amendment of corporate law, which was 
finally adopted in August, 2007. 
(iii) South Korea 
South Korea showed a different response, which was as quick as Thailand’s but much deeper in its coverage, 
mode and reach. The reform mostly took the mode of consecutive amendments of most fundamental legislations 
including the Commercial Code amendments in 1998 and in 1999. The coverage of reforms was substantially wide 
and tight: in order to strengthen the pressure of þmarket for corporate controlÿ, previous impediments for anti-
takeovers were all lifted up; Strengthening of minority shareholdersÿ rights covered the general loosening of 
thresholds for all categories, as well as the introduction of such new menus as the right to place agendas and the 
cumulative voting system for the selection of directors; Also, the strengthening of management responsibilities 
involved not only explicit provisioning of duty of loyalty forced by the conditionalities but also an original 
introduction of shareholders’ responsibilities piercing the corporate veil. The reach of reform was also wide enough 
to answer to the local context of non-listed companies: tightened disclosure rules including the mandatory 
consolidated disclosure were applied not only to listed companies but also to large non-listed companies; For the 
internal governance, such former market side systems as independent directors and the audit committee were newly 
introduced as voluntary systems under the amended Commercial Code generally applicable to non-listed companies. 
The South Korean attitude could be summarized as a serious endeavor to take responsibility in its own reform, even 
beyond the prescription given by the transplanted model. 
A comparison of the above three cases must provide interesting implications on the outcomes of different 
attitudes toward ‘Transplantation’. Though it has been suggested that the ‘receptiveness’ of reforming countries will 
decide the results of ‘Transplantations’ (Berkowit, Pistor, & Richard 2003), what can be learned from the above 
three cases seems to be against this assertion. These countries were all ‘forced’ to reform and in that sense equally 
‘unreceptive’ to the conditionalities. If the definition of þ receptivenessÿ  refers to the obedience of the 
governments to the pressure of þTransplantationÿii, Thailand and Indonesia in our cases showed equal obedience 
to the conditionalities, including their limitation of coverage, mode and reach. South Korea, on the other hand, took 
its own way in exploring better reforms and so far has achieved the earliest economic recovery among the three. 
An important implication would be that the ‘Transplantation’ to the most obedient and ‘receptive’ recipients has 
to be done with the most properly articulated model: otherwise, these ‘receptive’ recipients would end up with a 
copy of a limited model, and produce no positive result. 
Also, the reverse important implication to this is that the pure þreceptivenessÿ does not work when the 
transplanted model is weak. Given the basic þderegulationÿ stance of þmodel lawsÿ promoted in the þ
Transplantationÿ campaign, as studied in the section2 above, it should be empathized that there is a constant risk 
of failure in every ‘receptive’ reforming country in the ‘Transplantation’. 
 
3.2 Initiatives in Socialist Market Reform Countries: China and Vietnam 
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Asian socialist market reform countries such as China and Vietnam have been known for their ‘gradualism’ in 
managing the speed and the sequence of economic reform. In contrast to the ‘big bang’ style transition countries in 
Russia and Eastern Europe, these Asian socialists are found not at all ‘receptive’ to the ‘Transplantation’. 
Nevertheless, they have been continuing dramatic economic success, also in high contrast to the unstable economic 
trends in Russia and Eastern Europe. Is this contrast implying that þun-receptivenessÿ could be a better choice 
when the transplanted model is weak? 
Especially in the corporate governance area which is directly relevant to the State-Owned Enterprisesÿ reform, 
these Asian socialists have been developing unique legal designs, basically meant for the policy purpose of ensuring 
the Stateÿs watch as a þcorporate ownerÿ over the management of corporatized SOEs. It is only recent that these 
countries have gradually turned to be þreceptiveÿ to the þmodel lawsÿ or the US-style corporate governance. 
However they are not merely þreceptiveÿ but trying their respective ways to materialize the models’ concept in 
the local contexture, as most easily be observed in the provisions of 2005 corporate law amendments that occurred 
simultaneously in both countries. 
(i) China 
The Chinaÿ s Company Law amendment in 2005 has been explained as a big step towards the willful 
convergence to the US-style þshareholder-centered ideologyÿ. However, it should be noted that its basic structure 
of corporate governance centering on the superiority of shareholdersÿ  meetings, the European-style two-tier 
governance by the auditorsÿ council (Art.52-57;Art.118-120), and the co-determination involving workers (Art.52-
57;Art.118-120) remains unchanged, and even substantially strengthened, while the US-style minority shareholders
ÿ provisions are merely added, instead of replacing anything. 
Further notable is its basic stance of þre-regulationÿ , even when transplanting originally deregulationist 
designs from the US model. For example, in newly introducing the system of shareholdersÿ derivative suits 
(Art.152), the law did not only refer to procedural aspects but also added substantial provisions to strengthen and 
clarify the responsibility of the management (Art.148-150) as well as that of controlling shareholders (Art.21). This 
re-regulationist stance apparently goes beyond the minimum coverage of þmodel lawsÿ and against the theoretical 
justifications given for such a minimum stance in the contextual considerations of þself-regulatory modelÿ. 
(ii) Vietnam 
Vietnam has been following Chinaÿs gradualism approach with occasional corporate law changes reflecting the 
need of SOE reform. Its latest 2005 Enterprise Law has been campaigned as epoch-making, in the sense that it 
integrated all former rules separated to SOEs, private companies, and FDIs into one form. However, this integration 
task seems to have decided the basic conservative nature of the whole law while reflecting the need of SOE reform 
as the bottom line: administrative controls are still in the center of corporate governance, as shown in the 
strengthened roll of the enterprise registration system (Art.21). Also in the corporate internal governance, the State 
can still enjoy special controlling status in the shareholders’ meetings even after the partial privatization (or 
equitization) by exercising the voting preferential shares (Art.78). There are only limited numbers of provisions 
referring to minority shareholders, and their designs are weak. It is highly probable that the law-makers intentionally 
avoid the full lineup of minority shareholders’ rights which might go against the state’s controlling status in the 
corporate internal governance, unless there is any positive reason to utilize them for the sake of state controliii. 
It is surprising that Vietnam can continue this conservative legal design in amid of the international pressure 
under the US Trade Agreement and/or the negotiation for the entry into the WTO. It is probable that Vietnam could 
smartly clear the hurdle of ‘Transplantationÿ  just because of the vagueness of contents provided in a pro-
deregulation design of þmodel lawsÿ. Anyway, the 2005 Enterprise Law is another example of apparently þun-
receptiveÿ legal development, though the same law has been so far attributed with the successful inducement of 
investment to the country. 
After all, case studies in this section could be summarized in two findings: First, a simple þreceptivenessÿ 
sometimes brings about negative outcomes, especially when the þmodel lawsÿ are weak and vague. Second, even 
þun-receptivenessÿ can go for negative outcomes when the weak and vague design of ‘model laws’ gives excuse 
for a poor freehand. 
An implication will be that a successful legal development at least requires either the local initiatives to go 
beyond the weak models, or the good models suitably articulated for simply þreceptiveÿ recipients (see Table2 
below). 
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Table 2 Summary on the Outcomes of Transplantation 
 
 Transplantation with Weak Model 
(deregulation) 
Transplantation with Good Model 
(articulation) 
‘Receptive’ Recipients Un-successful (Thailand/Indonesia) Successful 
Initiative of Recipients Depends(China/Vietnam) Successful 
4. Toward the Asian Best Practices 
4.1 Focus on the Non-Listed Companies 
The review of Asian corporate law reforms studied above suggests that what is happening in the Asian law 
development scene is not a simple ‘Convergence’ to the Western model. Then, are they diverging from each other 
while taking each totally independent paths? The author anticipates some convergences in the region toward several 
choices of best practices, rather than a single uniform standard. In order to ascertain the figures of such best 
practices, the author’s group is on a survey to focus on the interaction of law and practice in the SME (small and 
medium-sized enterprises) investments in Asia. 
There are some reasons for this focus. First, amid the increasing trend of regional economic integration in Asia, 
foreign direct investments must be the very field for dynamic cross-border interactions among different corporate 
cultures. Second, corporate governance reforms in Asia cannot be completed without addressing to the need of non-
listed companies, especially the SMEs, which constitute the fundamental basis of regional economic development. 
Nevertheless, the majority of theories on corporate governance, including the series of most serious discussions after 
the Asian Crisis (for example, Claessens, Djangkov and Lang 1999), have been dealing only with large listed 
companiesiv. We realize a strong need to focus on the non-listed companies. 
 
4.2 Methodology: Survey on Japanese SME Investment in Asia 
As for the methodology for studying the Asian non-listed SMEs, the author and her colleagues have been trying a 
hybrid method to integrate the legal studies and the management studies on the corporate governance. Both studies 
have strengths and weaknesses. As for the main target of study, the legal studies have been particular about the law, 
but almost blind to the actual practices in the corporate sector; while the management studies have shown primary 
interests on what actually happens in the corporate daily business scene and its variety of contractual nexus, but had 
less accurate knowledge on the legal system. The author’s team will try corporate surveys with questionnaires 
specially prepared based on the accurate understanding of law, while focusing on the interaction between laws and 
commercial practices. 
The center of our study is a corporate survey on the front of SME investment in Asia from Japan. The SME 
sector in Japan is known as a tractor of economic growth (for example, Fujimoto, Nishiguchi and Ito 1997; 
Nakazawa 1998), and its production and management systems have been attempted to be transferred to other regions 
in Asia as a successful model for higher productivity. However, studies have shown that none of such transfers is 
going smoothly without modifications to customizing the Japanese model to the local contexture (Miyamoto 2002, 
etc.). Our study will further study this modification process, with special focus on the interaction of law and 
practice. 
The questionnaire of our survey consists of 4 components of (i) internal governance, (ii) transaction relations, 
(iii) employment relations, and (iv) creditors’ relations, while based on a hypothesis that the high productivity of 
Japanese SMEs has been developed amid a most difficult survival, fixed in a dilemma among long-term contractual 
relationships in a large brand network (keiretsu) under constantly inferior bargaining position, downward inflexible 
employment contracts, and creditorsÿ rigorous debt managements especially in the corporate financial culture 
centering on indirect financing. 
From August 2006 until now, under the research grants admitted by the Ministry of Science and Education of 
Japan, we have been conducting preliminary and/or main surveys in the automobile parts manufacturing sector in 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and China. China is a especially interesting study target, since the basic structure of 
Chinese formal law design is relatively close to that of Japan as a base-line model, which ensures a good basis for 
observing the differences in actual practices under the similar legal structures. 
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4.3 Our Hypothesis on China 
Though Chinaÿs amended Company Law and Security Law in 2005 is known as epoch-making changes (Iteya 
et al.2006), all menus seem basically directed to large listed companies, with special stresses on the takeovers in the 
security market side, the minority shareholders’ rights meant for institutional investors’ activism, and the 
independent directors expected to evaluate the ‘corporate best interest’ in amid of these crucial situations. It is not 
easily understandable how all these menus can work for the SMEsÿ sake, where the need of our survey is. 
(i) Internal Governance: 
Our first purpose is to ascertain for SMEs the real functions of such formal legal menus as the minority 
shareholders’ rights, the Supervisory Board, the participation of workers to the Board, and the substantial and 
procedural provisions on management liabilities. There has been a widely held skepticism about the effects of 
formal legal menus of Chinese law (for example Clarke 2003), especially for the SMEs which are usually under a 
close control by the owner and manager who water-downs all these formal institutions. However, since the new 
devices introduced by the 2005 amendment, including the minority shareholders’ rights and/or the strengthened 
workers’ participation to the Supervisory Board, can create a better condition for existing menus to resume their 
functions. 
First, there is a chance that the minority shareholdersÿ rights can be exercised by stakeholders who dare step in 
the status of shareholders, as in the case of Japanese cross-shareholding relations (mocha-ai). Transaction partners in 
a long-term relational contract, creditors also in a stable arm-length relation, and/or the workersÿ shareholding 
unions, have enough motivation to play important roles in activating the enriched lineup of formal law menus such 
as the right to call extraordinary shareholdersÿ meetings (Art. 40; Art.101), the right to propose agendas (Art.103), 
cumulative voting for elections of directors and supervisors (Art.106), preemptive rights of dissenting shareholders 
(Art.75), access to information (Art.34; Art.98), derivative suites (Art.152), controlling shareholders’ liabilities 
(Art.21), etc. 
Second, the Supervisory Board (or simply a supervisor for small-scale limited liability companies) is a mighty 
institution placed in the center of the two-tier style governance structure, bested with wide and rigorous 
management-oversight authorities including the proposal to dismiss directors (Art. 54; Art.119). Japanese law as a 
base-line model also provides for similar mighty roles of the auditors or the auditorsÿ meeting, which is however 
known for its limited functioning especially in the SMEs. The question is whether there are any chances of 
nominating supervisors who are independent and motivated enough to take their responsibility to oversee the 
management. Given the strengthened workersÿ participation in the Supervisory Board at least one-third in total 
number, as well as the increased chances for stakeholders to utilize the minority shareholders’ rights such as the 
cumulative voting for supervisors’ nominations which is mandatory in joint stock companies, there is an increased 
hope for the better function of Supervisory Boards. 
(ii) Relational Contracts: 
Even when the stakeholders do not choose to participate in the internal governance as minority shareholders, they 
do still have certain chances to watch over the management from the outside. As for the transactional partners, rights 
under the long-term relational contract, either explicitly or implicitly reflecting mutually accumulated þspecific 
investmentsÿ could be the basis to force accurate information disclosures, and to intervene into the material 
decision-makings. In this connection, the interaction of different transactional cultures between Japan and China 
should be considered, as suggested in Fujimoto and Shintaku (2005) on the þopen-modularÿ style business 
architecture of major Chinese manufacturers and its increasing interaction with Japanese investors. 
Also, as such contractual relationships could be both enhanced and hindered by the court’s application of contract 
law, as well as by the implementation of competition law as in the case of ‘abuse of superior bargaining position’ 
doctrine in Japan, the survey needs to cover the aspect of relevant formal law implementation. 
Also, as a result of the globalization of transactional relationships, SMEs are increasingly exposed to the rigorous 
contractual obligations put unilaterally by multinational enterprises, often involving strict standards on the corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). It will be one of the tasks of the survey to check the rationality of such obligations. 
(iii) Employment Relations: 
Workersÿ participation has been integrated in the formal corporate governance of Chinese Company Law from 
the beginning, and the 2005 amendment strengthened the system further closer to the European co-determination 
culture. However, there has been a constant criticism on the weak function of the system, mainly caused by the 
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collusions between the formal representatives of the in-house labor union and the management. Though our 
preliminary survey revealed the continued collusion, there is also some hint for activisms being initiated by 
collective actions among individual skilled workers beyond the company level, detailed conditions of which will be 
explored more by the main survey. 
Apart from these formal menus of corporate governance, actual pressures over the management under the 
employment contractual customs should be explored: whether there are any social pressures to push the 
normalization of long-term fully protected formal employments, just as in the phenomenon of ‘making employment 
terms of blue collars equal to white collars’ achieved in a roaring labor union activism in Japan’s rapid development 
process after the WWII. If that is the case, then the next question to ask is what the causes behind such changes are: 
increased state controls; pressures of the trade union movements; tighter conditions in the skilled labor market; 
expectations of SME managers to give incentives to the workersÿ skill formation or firm-specific investments; 
contractual obligations on CSR with multinational enterprises; any other foreign pressures, etc. 
(iv) Creditors’ Relation: 
Creditor’s oversight role as a ‘main bank’ cannot always be secured enough within the autonomy of contract, and 
hence the mandatory provisions in the Company Law, the Collateral Law and the Bankruptcy Law are quite 
important. 
However, the 2005 Company Law amendment does not provide much for creditorsÿ rights, choosing an Anglo-
American stance in this aspect. It has no mandatory disclosure clause for the creditors. It has even deleted prior 
systems of creditorsÿ claims in material management decisions. There is no substantial base for creditors to accuse 
management liabilities, except for the newly introduced ‘piercing the corporate veil’ clause (Art.20), the application 
of which is expected highly dependent on the court’s discretion. It has been a point in our survey to clarify whether 
the common law style ‘freedom of contract’ is working sufficiently enough in the reality. Also, direct interviews to 
the financers as well as the study of judicial cases will supplement the static study of legal provisions in the 
Collateral Law and the Bankruptcy Law. 
In summary, what appears from the Japanese SME investment front in China seems to be a unique experiment to 
bring up hybrid corporate governance where Japanese þtrustfulÿ relation based culture meets Chinese open-
modular style business culture. This experiment might turn to be an important step forward in the discussion toward 
the best practices in Asia. 
5. Conclusion 
For the purpose to ascertain the major trends of corporate governance in Asia, first in this article, major legal 
theories to encourage and justify the ‘Transplantation’ of Western models to Asia were reviewed, which revealed a 
theoretical distortion between the normative goals and the technical designs of corporate governance around the 
shareholder-centered approach (section2). Next, actual cases of þTransplantationÿ in Asia were reviewed, which 
implied the limitation of outcomes especially when poor þmodel lawsÿ are transplanted in a simple þreceptiveÿ 
way (in section3). Finally, in order to forecast the new trend toward the formation of Asian best practices, the basic 
idea of authorÿs recent corporate survey on the front of SME investment activities in Asia, especially in China, was 
explained (section-4). 
Perhaps, ‘Transplantation’ or ‘Convergence’ of the formal law means nothing without any local initiatives to 
apply them as a living law within the commercial practice. Though China’s recent formal law amendment cast an 
outlook of ‘Convergence’ to the US style shareholder-centered ideology, such a trend of formal law has in itself 
nothing to do with the commercial reality, especially for the non-listed SME managers who will determine the Asian 
future. Unless the transplanted formal menus are to be followed by the local commercial-side initiative to þ
customizeÿ (rather than disregard) them, the gap between the unused formal law and the mismanaged commercial 
practice will be enlarged. Only an accumulation of studies to act as a catalyst between the formal law knowledge 
and the actual practices on the very business front, will be able to detect the regional best practices out of various 
‘customizing ’ efforts toward a living law. 
 
References 
6894  Kaneko Yuka / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 6883–6895 
ADB (2000) “Corporate and Financial Sector Reform”, in Asian Development Outlook 2000, Oxford University Press. 
Asanuma, B. (1988) “Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships in Japan and the Concept of Relation Specific Skill,” Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economics, 3(1). 
Armour, J., Deakin, S., Lele, P. and Siens, M. (2007) “How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence form a Cross-Country Comparison,” presented at 
the Law and Society Association, Berlin Conference, July 25-28, 2007, Berlin. 
Armour, J., Deakin, S. and Konzelmann, S. L. (2003) “Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance,” 41 British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 531. 
Bebchuk and Roe, M. (1999) “A Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate Ownership and Governance,” 52 Stanford Law Review, 127. 
Berkowit, Pistor, & Richard (2003) “The Transplant Effect,” Am. J. Comp. L. 163. 
Berle, A. A. Jr. (1932) “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees: A Note,” 45 Harvard Law Review 1365. 
Berle, A. A. Jr. and Means, G. C. (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Harcourt, N.Y. 
Black and Kraakman (1996) “A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,”109 Harvard Law Review, 1911-82. 
Black, B., Kraakman, R. and Tarassova, A. (2006) “Russian Privertization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?,” in Fox, M. B. and 
Heller, M. A. ed. Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, 2006, Princeton University Press. 
Blair, M. and Stout, L. (2006) “Specific Investment and Corporate Law,” 85 Virginia Law Review 247. 
Claessens, S., Djangkov, S. and Lang, L.H. (1999) “Who Controls East Asian Corporations,” World Bank Policy Research Paper, No. 2054. 
Clark (2003) “Corporate Governance in China: An Overview,” 14 China Economic Review 494. 
Clark, K, B. and Fujimoto, T. (1991) Product Development Performance: Strategy, Organization, and Management in the World of Auto 
Industry, Harvard Business School Press. 
Coarse, R. H. (1937) “The Nature of the Firm,” 4 Economica 386. 
Cusumano, M. A. and Takeishi, A. (1995) “What we have learned and Have not Learned from ManufacturerSupplier Relations in the Auto 
Industry,” Working Paper 3840BPS95, Sloan School of Management, MIT. 
Dodd, E. M. (1932) “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,” 45 Harvard Law Review 1145. 
EBRD/ Slavova, S. and Bernstein, D. (1999) “Market perspective of corporate governance-EBRD survey results,” Law in transition, Autumn 
1999, EBRD. 
EBRD/ Chen, H. (2003) “Corporate Governance Sector Assessment Project: Report on the 2002 Assessment Results,” EBRD. 
EBRD (2004) Final Report: Improving Corporate Governance Legal Framework and Practice in Mongolia, GBRW Limited. 
Easterbrook, F. H. and Fischel, D. R. (1991) The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press. 
Fujimoto, T. and Shintaku, J. ed. (2005) Architecture-based Analysis of Chinese Manufacturing Industries, Toyokeizai-Shinpo-Sya, Tokyo (in 
Japanese). 
Fujimnoto, T., Nishiguchi, T. and Ito, H. (1997) Readings: Supplier System, Yuhikaku, Tokyo (in Japanese). 
Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (2001) “The End of History for Corporate Law,” 89 Georgetown Law Journal 438. 
Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. (2004) “What is Corporate Law?” in Kraakman, R. et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 2004. 
Hart (1995) Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press. 
Iteya, Y., Nunoi, C. and Shu, K. (2006) Amended Chinese Company Law and Security Law, Shojihoumu, Tokyo (in Japanese). 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure,” 3 Journal of 
Financial Economics. 
Kagawa, K. and Kaneko, Y. ed. (2007) Legal Assistance: An Introduction to the Internaitonal Cooperation for Institution Building, Minerva 
Shobo, Kyoto (in Japanese). 
Kanbe, N. (1998) “Conflict of Interests among Shareholders,” in Miwa, Y. et al. ed. Economics of Company Law, Tokyo University Publishers, 
1998 (in Japanese). 
Kaneko, Y. (2004) “Comparative Analysis of Law in Transition: Vietnam compared with Russia and China I&II,” Journal of International 
Cooperation Studies (GSICS, Kobe University), Vol.12 No.2, p. Vol.12 No.3, p., 2004 (in Japanese). 
Kaneko, Y. (2005) “A Study of Evaluation Method on Corporate Governance Systems in Asian Transition Economies,” Journal of International 
Cooperation Studies (GSICS, Kobe University), Vol.13 No.2, pp.49-88, 2005 (in Japanese). 
Kaneko, Y. (2006) “New Trend in the Corporate Governance Mechanisms among Asian Transition Economies, Journal of International 
Cooperation Studies (GSICS, Kobe University), Vol.14, No.2, p., 2006 (in Japanese). 
Kestor, C. (1992) “Industrial Group as Systems of Contractual Governance,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 8. 
Koike, K. (1997) Human Capital Development in Japanese Companies, Chuo-kouronsya (in Japanese). 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1996) “Law and Finance,” NBER Working Paper 5661. 
Miyamoto, K. (2002) Labor Market in the Far Front of Asian Development, University of Hokkaido Publishers (in Japanese). 
Nakazawa, T. (1998) New Era for SMEs, Iwanami, Tokyo (in Japanese). 
OECD (2003) “White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia,” OECD at http://www.oecd.org. 
Pistor, K. (2002) “The Standardization of Law and Its Effects on Developing Economies,” 50 American Journal of Comparative Law, 97-130. 
Rajan, R. G. and Zingales, L. (1998) “Power in a Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 387. 
Roe, M. J. (2001) “The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization,” 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2063. 
Suehiro, A. and Nateapha, W. (2004) “Family Business in Thailand: Its Manegment, Governance and Future Challenges,” ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin, Vol.21, No.1. April. 
Trubek, D. M. and Santos, A. (2006), The New Law and Development: A Critical Appraisal, Cambridge University Press. 
Tirole, J. (2001) “Corporate Governance,” 69 Econometrica 1. 
Thomsen, S. (2007) “Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility,” in-Kakabades, A. and Morsing, M. Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Reconciling Aspiration with Application, EABIS, 2007. 
Kaneko Yuka / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 6883–6895 6895
Uchida, T., and V. Taylor (2005) “Re-regulating Japanese Contracts,” in Foote, D. ed. Law in Japan: A Turning Point, University of Washington 
Press. 
Visser ‘T Fooft, W. (2002) Japanese Contract and Antitrust Law: A Sociological and Comparative Study, RoutledgeCurzon. 
Williamson, O. (1985) “The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,” 43 Economica. 
World Bank (2004) “Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC): Corporate Governance Country Assessment: REPUBLIC OF 
INDONESIA,” World Bank at http://www.worldbank.org. 
                                                          
i Roe (2001) argues that the efficiency will not be achieved by the corporate value maximization when the market condition is controlled, 
while linking an argument of corporate governance with the concerns of industrial organization. 
ii See Table 3 of Berkowit, Pistor, & Richard (2003). Japan is categorized as a ‘receptive’ case despite of a nationwide serious anti-Western 
law campaign which caused 9 years’ delay for the introduction of the 1899 Civil Code. This case must imply the authors’ definition of 
‘receptiveness’ as an ultimate obedience or surrender of the recipient government to the ‘Transplantation’ regardless of the receptiveness in the 
social process. Indeed, the Japanese government had no other choice but to obey, as the ‘Transplantation’ was a main pillar of conditions for the 
amendment of unequal provisions in the trade treaties (suspended rights to set import duties as well as denied jurisdiction over foreigners). 
iii For instance, derivative suits are only provided for subsidiary companies’ shareholders against the managers of parent companies (Art. 
147), which must be revealing the policy intention to device a block against the hostile M&A, but nothing more than that. 
iv Though some Asian scholars such as Suehiro et al. (2004) responded with more holistic evidences including non-listed companies, their 
approach did not go into the institutional aspects of the corporate governance. 
